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Abstract
Radio  Frequency  Identification  (RFID)  technology  is  a 
promising technology. It uses radio waves to identify objects. 
Through a utomatic  and  real-time  data  acquisition,  this 
technology can  give  a  great  benefit  to  various  industries  by 
improving  the e fficiency  of  their  operations.  However,  this 
ubiquitous technology has  inherited  problems  in security  and 
privacy.  EPC  Class  1 Generation 2  has  served  as  the most 
popular  standard  for  passive  RFID  tags.  To i mprove  the 
security of this standard, several protocols have been proposed 
compliant to this standard. In this paper we analyze the revised
Yeh et  al.’s(2010) protocol by Habibi et al.’s(2011) which is 
conforming t o  EPC-C1  G2 s tandard  and  is  one  of  the  most 
recent  proposed  protocols in t his  field.  We  discuss  several 
drawbacks  of  this  protocol,  then  we p resent  our  enhanced
protocol which the security analysis showed that it can improve
the security and privacy of RFID systems. 
Keywords: RFID,  EPC,  Mutual  Authentication,  Security, 
Privacy, Adversary
1.Introduction
Radio  Frequency I dentification,  abbreviated  ‘‘RFID’’ 
basically p rovides  a  means  to  identify  objects  having 
RFID tags attached. Fundamentally, RFID tags provide 
the  same  functionality  as  barcodes  but  usually h ave  a 
globally unique identifier. Using RFID, the identification 
is  performed  electromagnetically.  Thus,  there  is,  in 
contrast to barcodes, no line-of-sight necessary, and the 
identification can also be performed in contactless way. 
RFID also has the advantage that bulk reading is possible 
and that it is not susceptible to dust, dirt, or vibration like 
barcodes.  Because  of t hese  characteristics,  RFID  is 
envisioned  to  be  a  convenient  replacement  for  optical 
barcodes in the future [1].
There  are  several  interconnected  standards  for  RFID 
systems. Among them, ISO and EPC global have played 
the main role. In 2004 [2,3], the Electronic Product Code 
Class-1 Generation-2 specification (EPC-C1 G2 in short) 
was  announced  by E PC  Global  which  also  has  been 
ratified by I SO [4] and published as  an amendment to 
ISO/IEC18000-6.  This  standard  is  an  important 
milestone for the standardization of low-cost RFID tags. 
However, the later security analysis that carried out on 
the  EPC-C1  G2 s pecification  have  demonstrated 
important  security f laws  in  this  standard  [5,6]. This  is 
motivated researchers to  try  to  propose EPC-compliant 
schemes, trying to  correct the weaknesses and improve 
its security level, analyze the security of EPC-compliant 
schemes,  or  improve  the  vulnerable  schemes 
[7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14].  Among  them,  one  of  the  most 
recent  proposals that following  this  approach  is  an 
improvement to the Yeh et al. ’s protocol [14] proposed 
by Habibi et al. [12], which is the main concern of this 
paper. Habibi et al.  [12] have analyzed  the  security of
Yeh et al.’s protocol and proposed an improved protocol 
as a treatment for Yeh et al.’s protocol. However, other 
researches [7,11] have  demonstrate that  they  were  not 
success  in their attempt and  the proposed protocol has
security and privacy problems. In this paper we proposed 
an enhanced protocol that improving cited problems. The 
security analysis showed that the proposed protocol can 
improve the security and privacy of RFID systems. Also, 
it  can  be  applied  in  low-cost  RFID  environments 
requiring a high level of security.
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follows: Section2 briefly reviews Habibi et al.’s protocol. 
Section3  discusses  the  weakness  of  Habibi  et  al.’s 
protocol. The enhanced protocol is presented in Section4, 
while  Section5  discusses  the  security a nalysis  of t he 
proposed  protocol,  respectively.  Some  conclusions  are 
presented in Section6.
2. Review of Habibi et al.’s protocol
This section reviews Habibi et al.’s protocol [11].
Notations used in this paper are defined as follows:
 EPCs: The 96 bits of EPC code are divided into six 
16-bit blocks, and then the six blocks are XORed to 
get EPCs.
 DATA: The corresponding record for the tag kept 
in the database.
 Ki: The authentication key stored in the tag for the 
database  to  authenticate  the  tag  at  the  (i+1)th 
authentication phase.
 Pi: The access key  stored in the tag for the tag to 
authenticate  the  database  at  the    ( i+1)th 
authentication phase.
 Kold:  The  old  authentication  key s tored  in  the 
database.
 Knew:  The  new  authentication  key s tored  in  the 
database.
 Pold: The old access key stored in the database.
 Pnew: The new access key stored in the database.
 Ci: The database index stored in the tag to find the 
corresponding record of the tag in the database.
 Cold: The old database index stored in the database.
 Cnew:  The  new  database  index  stored  in  the 
database.
 X:  The  value  kept  as  either  new  or  old  to  show 
which key i n  the record  of the d atabase  is  found 
matched with the one of the tag.
 AB:A forwards a message to B.
 A⊕B: Message A is XORed with message B.
 RID: The reader identification number.
 H(.): Hash function.
The information kept within respective devices:
Tag: (Ki,Pi,Ci, EPCS)
Reader: RID
DataBase: 
(Kold,Pold,Cold,Knew,Pnew,Cnew,RID,EPCs,DATA)
Habibi  et  al.’s  protocol  consists  of t wo  phases:  the 
initialization phase, and the (i+1)th authentication phase.
2.1. Initialization phase
The manufacturer  generates random values for  K0,  P0 
and C0 respectively, and sets the values for the record in 
the  tag  (Ki=K0,  Pi=P0,  Ci=C0)  and  the  corresponding 
record  in  the  database  (Kold=Knew=K0,  Pold=Pnew=P0, 
Cold=Cnew= 0).
2.2. The (i +1)th authentication phase
The detailed steps of the authentication phase of Habibi 
et al.’s protocol are presented as follows:
1) The  reader  R  generates  a  random  number  NR and 
sends it to the tag T. 
2)  T  receives  NR,  generates  a  random  number  NT, 
computes M1, D, E and finally sends 
M1, D, E  and Ci to  R, where M1 = PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NR
⊕ NT) ⊕ Ki and  D = NT ⊕ Ki and  E = NT ⊕ PRNG(Ci
⊕ Ki). 
3) When R receives the message, it computes V= h(RID
⊕ NR) and forwards  M1, D, Ci, E, NR, V to the back-end 
server S.
4) After S receiving M1, D, Ci, E, NR, and V, it proceeds 
as follows. 
    - For  each  RID  stored  in  the  database,  it  computes 
h(RID⊕NR) and compares it with the received V to   
verifies R legitimacy. 
    - If  Ci = 0, which means that it is the first access to 
the    tag, it proceeds as follows, iteratively: 
      (a) Picks up an entry (Kold , Pold , Cold , Knew , Pnew , 
Cnew , RID, EPCs, DATA) stored in database. 
      (b)Verifies whether  M1 ⊕ Kold = PRNG(EPCS ⊕
NR ⊕ D ⊕ Kold)  or M1 ⊕ Knew = PRNG(EPCS ⊕
NR ⊕ D ⊕ Knew),  and  marks  X  as  old  or  new 
provided  that  the  verification  process  is  satisfied 
based on the new record or the old record. 
    - Otherwise,  S  uses  Ci as  an  index  to  find  the 
corresponding record in the database 
and verify whether PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NR ⊕ D ⊕ KX)
⊕ KX = M1. If  “No” the protocol  aborts. 
    - Verify whether NT ⊕ PRNG(Ci ⊕ KX) = E. If  “No” 
the protocol aborts. 
    - Computes   M2  and  Info  and  forwards  them  to  R, 
where  M2 = PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NT) ⊕ PX
      and Info = DATA ⊕ RID. 
    - If X=new,  updates  the  database  as  follows:   
Kold←Knew, Knew←PRNG(Knew),
Pold←Pnew, Pnew←PRNG(Pnew),
Cold←Cnew, Cnew←PRNG(NT⊕NR). 
    -   Else
           Cnew←PRNG(NT⊕NR). 
5) O nce R  receives  the  message, it extracts DATA  as 
Info⊕RID and forwards M2 to T. 
6)  When  T  receives  the  message,  it  verifies  whether 
PRNG(EPCs⊕NT)=M2⊕Pi. 
ACSIJ Advances in Computer Science: an International Journal, Vol. 3, Issue 2, No.8 , March 2014
ISSN : 2322-5157
www.ACSIJ.org
11
Copyright (c) 2014 Advances in Computer Science: an International Journal. All Rights Reserved.If “No” the protocol aborts. Else T authenticates S and 
updates the contents kept inside  as   K i+1←PRNG(Ki), 
Pi+1←PRNG(Pi), Ci+1←PRNG(NT⊕NR).
3.Weaknesses of Habibi et al.’s protocol
3.1.Secret Information Disclosure Attack
Castro et al. [7] present an efficient and passive attack 
that retrieves any  Secret Information of the tag include 
EPCs, Ki, and Pi. The adversary acts as follows:
1.  Eavesdrops  one  session  of p rotocol  and  stores  all 
transferred messages include: NR, Ci, M1 = PRNG(EPCS
⊕ NR ⊕ NT) ⊕ Ki, D = NT ⊕ Ki, E = NT ⊕ PRNG(Ci
⊕ Ki), M2 = PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NT) ⊕ PX.
2. ∀ i=0...Nd does as follows:
– Ki←i,
– NT←D ⊕ Ki,
– If E=NT ⊕ PRNG(Ci ⊕ Ki) then returns Ki and 
NT.
3. For the returned value of Ki and NT
from Step2 and ∀ i = 0 . . . Nd does as follows:
– EPC s ← i,
– If M1 = PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NR ⊕ NT) ⊕ Ki then 
returns EPCS.
4. For the returned value of K i and NT from Step2 and 
EPCs
from Step3 and ∀ i = 0...Nd does as follows:
– PX ← i,
– If M2 = PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NT) ⊕ PX then returns 
PX.
5. Returns the following values:
Pold = Pi,  Pnew = PRNG(Pi),  Kold = Ki,  Knew =
PRNG(Ki), Cold = Ci [7].
3.2. Tag Impersonation Attack
Tag impersonation attack is a forgery attack that leads to 
the identification of spoofed tags by a legitimate reader.
In 2012 Castro et al. [7], have shown how an adversary 
can deceive the reader to authenticate it as a legitimate 
tag. In the given tag impersonation attack, the adversary, 
which is  an active adversary,  can  fallow  the  steps that 
describe bellow:
Phase1  (Learning):  The  adversary  eavesdrops  one 
successful run of the  protocol and stores the messages 
exchanged  between  the  reader  and  the  legitimate  tag 
including NR, M1, D, Ci and E. At the end of this phase 
the records linked to this tag in the back-end database in-
clude  (Kold,  Pold,  Cold,  Knew,  Pnew,  Cnew,  RID,  EPSs, 
DATA) and  the  tag  record  includes  (Knew,  Pnew,  Cnew, 
EPSs),  where: Knew = PRNG(Kold), Pnew = PRNG(Pold), 
Cnew= PRNG(NT⊕ NR), M1 = PRNG(EPSs ⊕ NR⊕ NT)
⊕ Kold, D = NT ⊕ Kold and E = NT ⊕ PRNG(Cold ⊕
Kold).
Phase 2 (Impersonation): To impersonate the legitimate 
tag, the adversary  waits until the reader initiates a new 
protocol session, where:
1. The reader generates a random number NR´and sends 
it to the tag.
2. After receiving NR´, the adversary replies with M1´, 
D´, Ci´ and E´ where:
M1´= M1 = PRNG(EPCs ⊕ NR ⊕ NT) ⊕ Kold
Ci´= Cold
D´= D ⊕ NR ⊕ NR´= NT ⊕ Kold ⊕ NR ⊕ NR´
E´= E ⊕ NR ⊕ NR´= NT ⊕ PRNG(Cold ⊕ Kold) ⊕
NR ⊕ NR´
3. Once the reader receives the message, it computes V
= H(RID ⊕ NR´) and forwards M1´, D´, Ci´,E´, NR
and V to the back-end database.
4. Once the back-end database receives the message, it 
proceeds as follows:
- For  each  stored  RID in  the  database,  computes   
H(RID ⊕ NR´) and compares it with the received 
V.  Since  the  adversary has not manipulated the 
exchanged message from the reader to the back-
end database, the back-end database authenticates 
the reader.
- Assume that Ci´ ≠ 0, then back-end database uses 
Ci´= Ci as  an  index  to  find  the  corresponding 
record in the database. The record would be found 
in its records for the field Cold. Therefore the back-
end database marks X as old.
- Verifies  whether  PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NR´⊕
D´⊕Kold´)⊕Kold= M1, where:
   PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NR´⊕ D´⊕ Kold)⊕Kold =
   PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NR´⊕ D ⊕ NR ⊕ NR´⊕ Kold)
⊕ Kold = PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NR⊕ D ⊕ Kold) ⊕ Kold =
M1 = M1´.
- Verifies  whether  NT´⊕PRNG(Cold´⊕ Kold´) =
E´, where:
- NT´= D´⊕ Kold = NT ⊕ NR ⊕ NR´ ⇒ NT´⊕
PRNG(Cold ⊕ Kold) =  NT ⊕ NR ⊕ NR´⊕
PRNG(Cold ⊕ Kold) = E´.
- Authenticates the  adversary  as  a  legitimate  tag 
and  computes  M2´ and  Info as  follows,  and 
forwards them to the reader:
           M2´←  PRNG(EPCS ⊕	 NT´)  ⊕	 Pold´ and             
Info ←  DATA ⊕	RID
- Since X=old,  updates  the  back-end  database  as 
follows:
            Cnew´← PRNG(NT´⊕NR´).
5. Once  the  reader  receives  the  message,  it  extracts 
DATA and forwards M2 to the expected tag, which is 
the adversary.
Following the given attack, the adversary is authenticated 
by t he  back-end  database  as a  l egitimate  tag  with  a 
probability of 1 , while the  complexity of  the  attack  is 
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requirements [7]. 
3.3. Data Desynchronization Attack
In 2013 Deng and Zhu [11] have shown that the Habibi 
et  al.’s protocol, can't resist the data desynchronization 
attack  either.  Before  the  implementation  of  the  data 
desynchronization  attack,  Adversary  A needs  to  carry 
out a secret information disclosure attack that has been 
described  in  section 3.2.  Thus  A can  disclose  all  the 
Secret Information of T, including EPCs, Ki and Pi. Then 
A can easily launch the data desynchronization attack. 
The  process  of t he  data  desynchronization attack  is 
shown  as  follows.  Firstly,  A launches  the  secret 
information  disclosure  attack  and  retrieves  any s ecret 
information in T, including EPCS, Ki and Pi. Secondly, 
A eavesdrops the random number NR generated  by R 
and values Ci, M1, D, E generated by T in the following 
protocol run, and it intercepts the message Ci, M1, D, E 
from the tag to the reader. Thirdly, A Computes NT = D
⊕ Ki, M2 = PRNG(EPCS ⊕ NT) ⊕ Pi and forwards M2 
to T. Once T receives M2, it authenticates Server S and 
updates  the  contents  kept  inside  as  Ki+1←PRNG(Ki), 
Pi+1←PRNG(Pi),  Ci+1←PRNG(NT⊕NR).  Therefore,  the 
tag has refreshed the secrets Ki, Pi, Ci while the back-end 
server will not do it. Thus, the shared secret between the 
tag and the back-end server may not be the same, which 
can  bring  system  to  a  mess.  After  a  successful  data 
desynchronization attack,  because  A makes S  and  the 
valid  tag  T  share  the  different  secrets,  S  will  not  be 
authorized by T and T will not be authorized by S y et
[11].
3.4. Traceability Attack
Castro  et  al. [7]  have  shown that  the  Habibi et  al.’s 
protocol,  like  the  original  protocol,  puts  at  risk  the 
location privacy of tags’ holders because it is possible to 
track  tags  with  a  probability  of 1   – between  two 
successful  runs  of  the  authentication  protocol.  The 
following properties of the protocol are enough to trace a 
given tag Ti, as  long as it has not updated its  internal 
values:
1. When the reader or possibly the adversary A, which 
supplants  a  legal  reader  in  a  mutual  authentication 
session, sends a random number NR  to  the tag, it will 
answer with M1, Ci, where Ci is the tag’s index in the 
back-end database and will remain fixed as long as the 
tag  does  not  participate  in  another  successful  protocol 
run toupdate its internal values.
2. Given that the tag’s reply to the reader’s (or adversary) 
query includes D and E,
Where D = NT ⊕ Ki and E = NT ⊕ PRNG(Ci ⊕ Ki). It 
can be seen that if A computes Y as follows:
Y←D ⊕ E = NT ⊕ Ki ⊕ NT ⊕ PRNG(Ci ⊕ Ki) = Ki ⊕
PRNG(Ci ⊕ Ki) then Y only depends on Ki and Ci and 
these ones will remain fixed as long as the tag does not 
execute a new updating phase. Hence, Y can be used as a 
value to perfectly trace Ti [7].
4. Enhanced protocol
In order to eliminate the mentioned vulnerabilities in 3.1, 
3.2 and 3.3 sections, we can modify the message E as:       
E = NT ⨁ PRNG(Ci  ⨁ Ki)  ⨁ Pi. Although  the  cited 
vulnerabilities are  fixed by the above modification, but 
the  traceability p roblem that  has  been  discussed  in 
section 3.4, still  will  be u nsolved.  Hence,  we  need  to 
reconstruct the message E as following: E=PRNG(NT) ⨁
PRNG(Ci ⨁ Ki) ⨁ Pi to provide a secure protocol against 
all cited attacks.
Fig.1,  illustrates  the  (i+1)th  authentication  phase  of 
proposed  protocol.  The  detailed  steps  of t he 
authentication phase are presented as follows.
1) The  reader  R  generates  a  random  number  NR and 
sends it to the tag T. 
2)  T  receives  NR,  generates  a  random  number  NT, 
computes M1, D, E and finally sends 
M1, D, E  and Ci to  R, where M1 = PRNG(EPCS ⊕	NR
⊕	NT) ⊕	Ki and  D = NT ⊕	Ki and  E = PRNG(NT )⨁
PRNG(Ci ⨁ Ki) ⨁ Pi. 
3) When R receives the message, it computes V= h(RID 
⊕	NR) and forwards  M1, D, Ci, E, NR, V to the back-end 
server S.
4) After S receiving M1, D, Ci, E, NR, and V, it proceeds 
as follows. 
    - For  each  RID  stored  in  the  database,  it  computes 
h(RID⊕NR) and compares it with the received V to   
verifies R legitimacy. 
    - If  Ci = 0, which means that it is the first access to the 
tag, it proceeds as follows, iteratively: 
      (a) Picks up an entry (Kold , Pold , Cold , Knew , Pnew , 
Cnew , RID, EPCs, DATA) stored in database. 
      (b)Verifies whether  M1 ⊕	Kold = PRNG(EPCS ⊕	
NR ⊕	D ⊕	Kold)  or M1 ⊕	Knew = PRNG(EPCS ⊕	
NR ⊕	 D  ⊕	 Knew),  and  marks  X  as  old  or  new 
provided  that  the  verification  process  is  satisfied 
based on the new record or the old record. 
    - Otherwise,  S  uses  Ci as  an  index  to  find  the 
corresponding record in the database 
and verify whether PRNG(EPCS ⊕	NR ⊕	D ⊕	KX) 
⊕	KX = M1. If  “No” the protocol  aborts. 
    - Verify whether PRNG(NT )⨁ PRNG(Ci ⨁ Ki) ⨁ Pi = 
E. If  “No” the protocol aborts. 
    - Computes   M2  and  Info  and  forwards  them  to  R, 
where  M2 = PRNG(EPCS ⊕	NT) ⊕ PX
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    - If   X =new,  updates  the  database  as f ollows: 
Kold←Knew, Knew←PRNG(Knew),
        Pold←Pnew, Pnew←PRNG(Pnew),
        Cold←Cnew, Cnew←PRNG(NT⊕NR). 
    -   Else
           Cnew←PRNG(NT⊕NR). 
5) O nce R  receives  the  message, it extracts DATA  as 
Info⊕RID and forwards M2 to T. 
6) W hen  T  receives  the  message,  it  verifies  whether 
PRNG(EPCs⊕NT)=M2⊕Pi. 
If “No” the protocol aborts. Else T authenticates S and 
updates  the  contents kept inside  a s  K i+1←PRNG(Ki), 
Pi+1←PRNG(Pi), Ci+1←PRNG(NT⊕NR).
Fig. 1 (i +1)th authentication phase of proposed protocol
4.1. Security analysis of enhanced protocol
In this section security and privacy of proposed protocol 
is evaluated against various threats. 
4.1.1. Secret Information Disclosure Attack
The proposed protocol resists to this attack, because of 
XOR Piwith E. By this modification, step 2 of this attack
has not established, because the adversary does not know 
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fallow:
∀ i=0...Nd does as follows:
– Ki←i,
   – NT←D ⊕	Ki,
   – E ≠ NT ⊕	PRNG(Ci⊕	Ki) ⊕	Pi .
4.1.2. Desynchronization Attack
An  adversary  requires  tag’s  Secret  Information for 
desynchronization  attack  that  has  been  avoided  in 
proposed protocol. Also keeping Kold, Cold, Pold values in 
back-end  server  can h elp  to  avoid  desynchronization 
Attack  occurrence.
4.1.3. Replay Attack
Updating the secret values in each authentication process
and the prevention ofSecret Information disclosure, and 
in particular using random values NR and NT for making 
the transition  massages,  an  adversary c annot  send 
obtained  information in the  next  round of the
authentication instead of legal tag, because of variation 
of massages.
4.1.4. Traceability Attack
In the proposed protocol to resist this attack that has been 
discussed  in  section3.4, NT has  been  replaced  by 
PRNG(NT) in the message E, so in the proposed attack 
the  result  of   X OR  messages  D  and  E  is  not  fixed 
because of the random value (NT) has not been deleted. 
D = NT ⊕ Ki
E = PRNG(NT) ⊕ PRNG(Ci ⊕ Ki) ⊕ Pi
Y = D ⊕ E = NT ⊕ Ki ⊕ PRNG(NT) ⊕ PRNG(Ci ⊕
Ki) ⊕ Pi
As  a  result  the  value  of Y  is not fixed in  each 
authentication phase although the updating phase has not 
been executed.
4.1.5. Privacy
In  proposed  protocol  the  privacy  problem  has  been 
solved  because of a voidance  of  Secret  Information
disclosure and traceability attacks.
4.1.6. DoS Attack
If an adversary prevents the tag from updating it’s secret
information  by i ntercepting  M2,  the server  is
asynchronous with  the  tag and  at  a  result  the 
communication between them will be intercepted, but In 
this  case by keeping  Cold value in  the database, in  the 
next authentication session the server supposed that tag 
authentication  process  in  the  previous  session  is  not 
completed successfully. Then it authenticates the tag by 
it’s Cold and only updates it’s Cnew.
4.1.7. Tag Impersonation Attack
The proposed protocol resists to tag impersonation attack
that has been discussed in section 3.2, by changing the 
structure of E as fallowing: E=PRNG(NT )⨁ PRNG(Ci ⨁
Ki) ⨁ Pi.
By this modification the back-end server cannot confirm 
E´ as below:
PRNG(NT´) ⊕	PRNG(Cold ⊕	Kold) ⊕	Pi = E´
NT´ = D´⊕	Kold = NT ⊕	NR ⊕	NR´⇒	PRNG(NT´) ⊕	
PRNG(Cold ⊕	Kold) ⊕	Pi		= PRNG(NT ⊕	NR ⊕	NR´) ⊕	
PRNG(Cold ⊕	Kold) ⊕	Pi≠ E´.
4.1.8. Database Loading
In this protocol, similar to previous version, Ci is used as 
an index to access the database which requires record-by-
record  operations  and  verifications  only i n  the  first 
access and the index for the tag can be set accordingly. 
As for any later on accesses, only Ci will be needed as an 
index. Thus, the performance of the system has not been
changed.  
              Table1. Comparison of authentication protocols
Chien   a nd 
Chen
Yeh et al Habibi et al
Proposed 
protocol
Desynchronization 
Attack
Insecure Insecure Insecure Secure
Replay Attack secure Secure Secure Secure
Tracking Attack Insecure Insecure Insecure Secure
Privacy No provide No provide No provide Secure
DoS Attack Insecure Insecure Insecure Secure
Tag Impersonation 
Attack
Insecure Insecure Insecure Secure
Database Loading High Low Low Low
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we demonstrated some security problems 
of Habibi  et  al.’s  RFID a uthentication  protocol.  We 
discussed a powerful and practical attack on this protocol
which is secret information disclosure. This attack leads 
to desynchronization attack. Moreover, we explained the 
tag  impersonation  and  traceability attacks  on this 
protocol.  To  eliminate  all  cited  vulnerabilities,  we 
enhanced this protocol by reconstructing the message E
in a new way. Finally the  enhanced protocol, has been
compared with the existing EPC-C1-GEN2-based RFID 
authentication protocols in terms of security and privacy. 
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protocol can enhance the security and privacy in RFID 
systems.
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